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The Intoxication Defence:
Constitutionally Impaired and in
Need of Rehabilitation
Gerry Ferguson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The intoxication defence encompasses both voluntary and involuntary intoxication. Involuntary intoxication arises relatively infrequently
as a defence and its rules are less well developed. On the other hand, the
rules governing voluntary intoxication as a defence have been frequently
considered and applied, but nevertheless remain in a wholly unsatisfactory state. They are illogical, arbitrary, unprincipled and in various
respects unconstitutional. In this article, I will briefly examine the rules
for involuntary intoxication as a defence and suggest that, in part, they
probably violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 and in
any event should be amended and included as a new Criminal Code2
provision. I will then examine the current rules for voluntary intoxication
as a defence, alluding to their historical development as well as the
various ways in which they are unsatisfactory. I will also point to three
areas in which the current rules are, or may be, unconstitutional.
The first area of Charter concern is in respect to section 33.1 of the
Criminal Code. Section 33.1 is Parliament’s partial reversal of R. v.
Daviault3 and it likely violates section 7 of the Charter. In addition, there
is a strong argument that this violation is not saved under section 1 since
other constitutionally valid alternatives are available to Parliament to
achieve the objectives it had in mind in enacting section 33.1. Second,
the reverse onus imposed in Daviault and continued in section 33.1 is a
*
University of Victoria Distinguished Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria. I
would like to thank Professors Benjamin Berger and Christine Boyle for their helpful comments on
an earlier draft of this paper, and Ashley Anne Caron for her valuable research assistance.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
3
[1994] S.C.J. No. 77, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Daviault”].
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clear violation of the Charter’s section 11(d) guarantee of the presumption of innocence. That reverse onus is illogical and, more importantly,
unnecessary. The Supreme Court’s conclusion that the section 11(d)
Charter violation is a reasonable limit under section 1 should be reexamined in light of the fact that the Supreme Court justified that
reversal in barely one paragraph of reasoning — hardly a full and fair
section 1 analysis! Third, there is a gap in the section 33.1 and Daviault
rules. Those rules do not provide a defence to a person who lacks the
general mens rea for an offence due to a mistake of fact caused by
intoxication which is less than extreme intoxication akin to automatism
or insanity. That gap offends section 7 and is not saved by section 1 of
the Charter.
I will conclude this paper by recommending a more logical, more
fair and constitutionally valid set of intoxication offences which involve
the creation of new included offences to deal with cases in which
voluntary intoxication has negated the subjective fault of the offence
charged. When an accused is acquitted of any subjective fault offence
because the requisite subjective fault is negated due to voluntary intoxication, that accused will be automatically convicted of a lesser included
offence of “unintentionally causing that offence due to criminal intoxication”. For example, in the case of a charge of sexual assault, such a
person would be convicted of the new offence of “unintentional sexual
assault due to criminal intoxication”.

II. INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION
Statistically speaking, it is fair to say that the law’s treatment of involuntarily intoxicated accused persons is not a pressing social concern.
In the past, cases in which persons have been surreptitiously or otherwise
involuntarily intoxicated have arisen relatively infrequently, although
there appears to be a significant increase in surreptitious administration
of the drug GHB, and other similar “date rape” drugs. But in these and
other cases, the involuntarily intoxicated person is normally a “victim”
rather than an offender. Seldom does an involuntarily intoxicated person
commit an offence while in a state of involuntary intoxication. But in
those rare cases where that does occur, how does and how ought the law
to deal with them? The fact that such cases are rare is no justification for
allowing an incomplete and perhaps unconstitutional law to continue
unamended.
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In examining the law of involuntary intoxication, the first issue is to
determine in what circumstances the law treats intoxication as involuntary. If a person, against his or her will, is forced to take or has administered to him or her an intoxicant, that person is involuntarily intoxicated.
Likewise, if an intoxicating substance is surreptitiously inserted into food
or drink that a person consumes, or is surreptitiously administered to a
person, that person is also involuntarily intoxicated. However, there is a
third form of intoxication where the case law is less clear in classifying it
as voluntary or involuntary. How does the law treat a person who
voluntarily consumes (or is consensually administered) a drug (e.g.,
medication) without being aware of its intoxicating qualities, or voluntarily consumes a drug, being aware that it has some intoxicating qualities,
but mistaken about the extent of that drug’s intoxicating effect? In many
jurisdictions, intoxication which has occurred through no fault of the
accused will be classified as involuntary intoxication. Conversely,
intoxication caused by some degree of fault on the part of the accused
will not be treated as involuntary intoxication.4 In Canada, in R. v.
Chaulk,5 R. v. Saxon6 and R. v. Abel,7 the appeal courts have held that if a
person knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that the substance
voluntarily consumed was an intoxicant, then a claim of involuntary
intoxication will fail. Likewise, in R. v. Hardie8 the English Court of
Appeal held that where self-induced intoxication by medical drugs is
“faultless” (subjectively and objectively), the person will be treated as
involuntarily intoxicated. In effect, this principle of faultless intoxication
seems to have also prevailed in the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v.
King,9 although the stated rationales of both Taschereau and Ritchie JJ.
for acquittal are somewhat different. In R. v. Allen10 the English Court of
Appeal held that ignorance or mistake as to the strength of an alcoholic
4

See, however, S. Bronitt & B. McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law, 2d ed. (Pyrmont,
NSW: Lawbook Co., 2005), at 257, where the authors note that the legislative provisions in some
Australian jurisdictions indicate that intoxication which results from a “reasonable” mistake will be
considered involuntary: see s. 428G of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s. 1 of the Criminal Code (NT),
s. 34 of the Criminal Code (ACT) and s. 8.1 of the Criminal Code (CTH).
5
[2007] N.S.J. No. 301, 223 C.C.C. (3d) 174 (N.S.C.A.) [hereinafter “Chaulk”].
6
[1975] A.J. No. 432, 22 C.C.C. (2d) 370, at 375-76 (Alta. S.C.) [hereinafter “Saxon”].
7
[1999] A.J. No. 190, 134 C.C.C. (3d) 155 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter “Abel”].
8
[1985] 1 W.L.R. 64 (C.A.).
9
[1962] S.C.J. No. 60, [1962] S.C.R. 746 (S.C.C.). In R. v. Penno, [1990] S.C.J. No. 96,
59 C.C.C. (3d) 344 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court unanimously held that voluntary intoxication is no
defence to care and control of a motor vehicle, and its exclusion as a defence does not violate the
Charter. The Court varied in its reasons in reaching that conclusion. In essence, the Court held that
the mens rea for impaired driving or care and control is voluntary consumption of alcohol.
10
[1988] Crim. L.R. 698 (C.A.).
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drink that is voluntarily consumed will not be treated as involuntary
intoxication. The same result will presumably be reached in Canada on
the basis that everyone who knows that alcohol or other drugs can have
an intoxicating effect has subjectively, or at least objectively, taken a risk
that their impairment may result in their commission of an offence.
The Canadian rule as articulated in cases such as Chaulk, Saxon and
Abel is too broadly cast and arguably offends section 7 of the Charter. It
can be forcefully argued that depriving an accused of the benefits of a
defence of involuntary intoxication on the basis of an objective standard
of fault (i.e., “ought to have known”) at least for stigma offences is an
unconstitutional application of substituted fault.11 And even if this
substituted fault is not unconstitutional for subjective offences that are
not classified as stigma offences, the application of an objective fault
standard to exclude a defence that negates subjective fault or voluntariness is undesirable. Similar to rules governing mistake of fact, where the
offence charged requires subjective mens rea, an accused should not lose
the benefit of involuntary intoxication unless he or she knew or was
subjectively reckless or wilfully blind to the fact that the substance was
an intoxicant. Being objectively negligent should not suffice unless the
offence committed is an offence of criminal or penal negligence.
Once an accused’s intoxication is classified as involuntary, the next
question is what rules of exculpation apply to an involuntarily intoxicated person. Should the same rules apply to involuntary intoxication as
apply to voluntary intoxication? If that were the case, there would be no
need to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary intoxication. But
there is an essential difference between the two. Involuntary intoxication
occurs blamelessly, voluntary intoxication does not. That difference
should be reflected in the rules governing both situations. At a minimum,
an involuntarily intoxicated person who lacks the intent or the voluntariness for the offence charged, whether specific or general, should be
acquitted. In other words, the strictures of the specific-general intent rule,
as modified in Daviault and section 33.1, which apply to cases of
voluntary intoxication should not apply to cases of involuntary intoxication. That proposition seems to be recognized in Canadian case law.12
11
R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Martineau”]; R. v. Logan, [1990] S.C.J. No. 89, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 731 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Finta, [1994]
S.C.J. No. 26, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 (S.C.C.).
12
In Chaulk, supra, note 5, the trial judge acquitted the accused on three general intent
assault-related offences on the basis of involuntary intoxication. The Court of Appeal reversed,
holding that the accused’s intoxication was voluntary. However, the Court did not appear to dispute

(2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d)

THE INTOXICATION DEFENCE

115

Likewise, involuntary intoxication can and should be a defence to
offences of penal or criminal negligence, provided the accused’s state of
involuntary intoxication did not arise out of negligence on the accused’s
part.13
Those two differences from the rules governing voluntary intoxication arguably do not constitute, by themselves, an adequate and just set
of rules for involuntary intoxication as a defence. Intoxication normally
has to be quite high to negate specific or general intent. It is well recognized that milder forms of intoxication do not negate intent, but do
loosen inhibitions to the extent that a person would not have committed
the offence but for the intoxication. Those offences could run the gamut
from a foolish incident of theft or damage to property to a serious assault,
or perhaps even intentional killing. The law is clear that voluntary
intoxication that loosens inhibitions but does not negate intent is no
defence.14 But should a person who was blameless in becoming intoxicated be entitled to claim lessened or diminished control as a defence?
Although it is controversial, I suggest that they should and that such a
claim of diminished control due to involuntary (blameless) intoxication
may be supported under principles of fundamental justice in section 7 of
the Charter. Such a defence is not entirely unknown. The famous 19thcentury codifier, Thomas Macaulay, who in 1837 prepared a draft
Criminal Code for the then British colony of India, included a straightforward provision which in effect recognized diminished control due to
involuntary intoxication as a defence.15 Unfortunately, Macaulay’s
provision was altered beyond recognition when the Indian Penal Code
was finally enacted in 1860.16 As far as I am aware, no other commonwealth jurisdiction replicated Macaulay’s diminished control defence for
involuntary intoxication until the enactment of section 8.5 of the Austrathat if the accused’s intoxication was involuntary he would be entitled to an acquittal on general
intent offences involving assault. Section 33.1 is expressly restricted to “self-induced” intoxication.
13
R. v. King, supra, note 9.
14
D.P.P. v. Beard, [1920] A.C. 479 (H.L.) [hereinafter “Beard”]; R. v. George, [1960]
S.C.J. No. 53, [1960] S.C.R. 871 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “George”]; R. v. Leary, [1977] S.C.J. No. 39,
[1978] 1 S.C.R. 29 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Leary”].
15
In s. 68 of his draft Code, Macaulay provided that “Nothing is an offence which a person
does in consequence of being, at the time of doing it, in a state of [involuntary] intoxication.” For a
full account of Macaulay’s treatment of involuntary intoxication, and the abandonment of it by the
final drafters of the Indian Penal Code, see G. Ferguson, “Intoxication” [hereinafter “Ferguson,
‘Intoxication’”] in W.C. Chan, B. Wright & S. Yeo, eds., Codification, Macaulay and the Indian
Penal Code: The Legacies and Modern Challenges of Criminal Law Reform (Farnham, UK:
Ashgate, 2011).
16
Act No. 45 of 1860 (October 6, 1860).
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lian Commonwealth Criminal Code in 2002.17 That same provision was
adopted in the Australian Capital Territory Criminal Code Act 200218 and
subsequently adopted in the Northern Territory Criminal Code Act
2005.19 A lessened inhibitions standard for involuntary intoxication was
also adopted by the English Court of Appeal on a charge of indecent
assault in R. v. Kingston20 under the rubric of a defence of “innocent
intent”. However, the House of Lords overruled that decision and held
that there is no defence of innocent intent or lessened inhibitions by
reason of involuntary intoxication.21 Subsequently, the English Law
Commission22 and the Tasmania Law Reform Institute23 examined and
rejected the idea of an involuntary intoxication defence based on lessened inhibitions.
Notwithstanding these rejections of such a defence, I think there is a
sound moral basis for exculpating such accused persons. It can be argued
that principles of fundamental justice dictate that persons who would not
have committed an offence but for the unlawful imposition of intoxication on them deserve not to be punished even if they intended the offence
committed. At first glance, it may seem contrary to ordinary principles of
responsibility to acquit a person of an offence if the person has committed it with the requisite mental fault element. However, that is precisely
what the law does in the context of certain other lawful justifications and
excuses, such as self-defence, necessity or duress. In each of those
instances, the mental element for the offence committed exists, but the
accused is excused or justified in committing that offence for sound
policy reasons. In the case of involuntary intoxication, the accused
should be entitled to an acquittal because his or her ordinary volitional
control mechanisms are impaired, through no relevant fault of his or her
own, to the extent that the accused has committed an offence which he or
she would not have committed if sober. Under those circumstances, it is
unfair to hold that person to blame for something which was in effect
caused through no fault of his or her own.
17
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Act No. 12), s. 8.5, came into force in 2002. See also Tasmania
Law Reform Institute, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, Final Report No. 7 (2006), at 53-60
[hereinafter “Tasmania Law Reform Institute”].
18
Criminal Code Act 2002 (A2002-51), s. 34.
19
Criminal Code Amendment (Criminal Responsibility Reform) Act (Act No. 37, 2005).
20
[1994] 1 Q.B. 81, at 87 (C.A.).
21
[1995] 2 A.C. 355 (H.L.). The House of Lords held that if such a defence was to be
created, it was a task for Parliament, not the courts.
22
Law Commission for England and Wales, Intoxication and Criminal Liability, Report
No. 314 (UK Cm 7526, 2009), at 86-91 [hereinafter “Intoxication and Criminal Liability”].
23
Tasmania Law Reform Institute, supra, note 17, at 94-102.
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Critics of the lessened inhibitions concept argue that it is an unworkable test because it would be virtually impossible to determine whether
the accused would not have committed the offence had he or she not
been involuntarily intoxicated. While this is a legitimate concern, it is not
insurmountable. Like many other legal tests, it will be easy to infer in
some cases and difficult to infer in other cases, just as inferences about
the accused’s fault or state of mind are easy to draw in some cases and
difficult to draw in other cases. Judges and juries rely on their own
experience and common sense in drawing such inferences. It may,
however, require specialized rules regarding the admissibility and use of
the accused’s prior conduct and character. While it is challenging to craft
specific evidence rules for certain contexts, as we have seen in regard to
self-defence (e.g., in regard to the admissibility of evidence concerning
the complainant’s disposition for violence), battered woman syndrome
(e.g., specific directions on how a judge or jury should use expert
evidence in respect to the battered woman syndrome), and rape shield
evidence laws (e.g., ss. 276-278), it is not impossible.
A more substantial argument against a lessened inhibitions rule is the
claim that the accused is still morally blameworthy if he or she intentionally or recklessly commits an offence, even though the accused would
not have committed that offence if sober.24 This claim is often premised
on the assumption that an involuntarily intoxicated person will become
aware of his or her intoxication and at that stage has an obligation or
responsibility to monitor his or her behaviour from that point on. In fact,
in many cases, involuntarily intoxicated persons may not know they are
intoxicated.25 Second, even if a person does become aware of his or her
intoxication, it may be unfair to impose a duty or responsibility on that
person to “make special efforts to see and avoid risks” when his or her
blameless state of intoxication has impaired the very qualities — intellectual and moral judgment and ordinary behaviour control mechanisms —
that are relevant to taking special precautions to avoid commission of a
crime.
A third concern with a lessened inhibitions test for involuntary intoxication is its potential to be a complete defence to the intentional
commission of the most serious of offences by persons whose inhibitions
24

Id., at 97.
Some commentators have suggested that the law should treat involuntarily intoxicated
persons who are unaware that they are intoxicated more leniently than involuntarily intoxicated
persons who become aware that they are intoxicated. While there may be some merit in that claim, I
have not adopted it in my proposed draft.
25
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are only modestly impaired. For example, suppose A, while in a state of
involuntary intoxication, intentionally sexually assaults or kills V. An
acquittal for sexual assault or for murder in such circumstances would
indeed be a cause for concern in most circumstances. But this sort of
unlikely hypothetical must be put into context. The lessened inhibition
defence for involuntary intoxication only applies in circumstances where
the accused would not have committed the offence but for the involuntary intoxication. Involuntary intoxication is rare. Intentionally killing or
sexually assaulting another person while in such a state would be even
rarer. If such a claim ever arose, in my view a judge or jury would be
naturally skeptical and therefore very slow to accept that an intentional
killing or sexual assault was committed as a consequence of the accused’s involuntary intoxication, and would not have occurred but for the
involuntary intoxication. In addition, under my proposal for a lessened
inhibitions defence of involuntary intoxication, the accused is not entitled
to rely on involuntary intoxication to a subjective fault offence like
murder or sexual assault if the accused was subjectively reckless or
wilfully blind in becoming intoxicated.
Finally, there may be a slippery slope concern. If lessened inhibitions
due to blameless intoxication is recognized as an excuse for crime, why
shouldn’t lessened inhibitions due to blameless circumstances such as
mental and behavioural disorders, social upbringing, economic circumstances, absence of essential social safety nets for those in need, etc., be
an excuse for crime if the accused would not have committed the crime
but for his or her blamelessness in regard to the existence of those
circumstances? This is a fair and legitimate question. A full analysis of it
is beyond the scope of this paper, but I would make a few brief points.
First, I suggest that the law needs to step onto slippery slopes where
fairness and justice demand. The law is quite capable of carefully and
cautiously taking one step at a time. Second, the law already recognizes
some instances of impaired or lessened inhibitions, such as some
incidents of necessity, duress, provocation and entrapment. Third,
recognition of a discretely contained and infrequently occurring defence
of lessened inhibitions due to blameless intoxication may have the
positive effect of opening up a wider debate on the relevance of lessened
inhibitions to criminal liability. That debate on the extent to which
current criminal law and its categories for blame “scapegoat” vulnerable
members of society and thereby consciously and unconsciously reject
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and hide society’s complicity in the commission of criminal harms is
long overdue.26
In light of the above analysis, I propose the enactment of an involuntary intoxication defence provision along the following lines:
(1) No person shall be convicted of an offence in respect of an act or
omission committed in consequence of being in a state of involuntary
intoxication.
(2) For the purpose of this section, a person is in a state of
involuntary intoxication in circumstances where the substance which
intoxicated that person was consumed or administered
(a) against that person’s will,
(b) without that person’s knowledge, or
(c) in ignorance of its intoxicating quality,
and provided that the compulsion, lack of knowledge or ignorance in
paragraphs (a) to (c) did not arise from subjective recklessness or wilful
blindness on the part of that person in the case of subjective fault
offences, or penal negligence in the case of objective fault offences.

Under the above proposal, if A commits a subjective fault offence
(e.g., assault, theft or mischief), while intoxicated by reason of circumstance (a), (b) or (c) in subsection (2), A is involuntarily intoxicated and
is not guilty of that subjective fault offence even if A acted with the
requisite subjective fault for that offence, provided: (1) A would not have
committed that offence if A was not so intoxicated; and (2) A was not
subjectively reckless or wilfully blind in becoming intoxicated by reason
of circumstances (a) to (c). If A was subjectively reckless in regard to his
intoxication under circumstance (a) to (c), A is not involuntarily intoxicated and cannot therefore rely on the defence of involuntary intoxication. In this latter circumstance, A may rely on voluntary intoxication as a
defence if the requirements for voluntary intoxication have been met. On
the other hand, if A was objectively but not subjectively reckless in
becoming intoxicated under circumstances (a) to (c), A can rely on
involuntary intoxication as a defence to any subjective fault offence, but

26
See, e.g., B. Berger, “Mental Disorder and the Instability of Blame in Criminal Law” in
F. Tanguay-Renaud & J. Stribopoulos, eds., Rethinking Criminal Law Theory: New Canadian
Perspectives in the Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational and International Criminal Law (Oxford:
Hart Publishing, 2012) 117.
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not to an objective fault offence such as causing death or bodily harm by
criminal negligence or careless use of a firearm by penal negligence.
Clause (c) of subsection (2) deals with a situation where the accused
knowingly consumes, or consents to the administration of, a substance
with no knowledge of its intoxicating properties. This clause draws a
hard line between no knowledge of a substance’s intoxicating effect and
mistaken knowledge as to the strength or extent of its intoxicating effect.
The first scenario is treated as involuntary intoxication. The second
scenario is treated as voluntary intoxication.

III. VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION
1. The Specific-General Intent Rule
Accepting voluntary intoxication as a partial or complete defence to
any crime can be a controversial matter. This controversy is heightened
by the indisputable fact that a large percentage of crimes, and especially
crimes of violence, are committed by persons who have voluntarily
consumed alcohol or drugs.27 There is a strong correlation between
intoxication and the commission of crime, even if that relationship is not
purely causal. At the same time, although intoxicated crime is frequent,
the extent to which intoxication exempts an offender from full or partial
liability should not be exaggerated. While alcohol and drugs loosen an
offender’s inhibitions and render the commission of crime more likely,
that circumstance alone provides no defence.28 There is only a small
percentage of intoxication cases where the intoxication is so extreme that
27
In Family Violence in Canada: A Statistical Profile (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Justice
Statistics, Statistics Canada, 2005), K. Beattie utilizes the 2004 General Social Survey, showing an
association between alcohol and violence in domestic settings: 44 per cent of women stated that their
partner had been drinking at the time of violence, and women with partners classified as “heavy
drinkers” (five or more drinks on one occasion) experienced a greater likelihood of violence than
women with “moderate” drinking partners. N. Desjardins and T. Mahony revealed in “Trends in
Drug Offences and the Role of Alcohol and Drugs in Crime”, in Juristat (February 2004), that
alcohol-dependent inmates were much more likely to have committed a violent crime than were
drug-dependent inmates. Further, the General Social Survey from 1999 revealed that 51 per cent of
victims of physical assaults and 45 per cent of victims of sexual assault believed their incident was
related to the assaulter’s use of alcohol. See also K. Pernanen, Alcohol in Human Violence (New
York: The Guildford Press, 1991) and Intoxication and Criminal Liability, supra, note 22, at 1-2,
summarizing data indicating that in 46 per cent of violent incidents, victims believe their offender(s)
to be under the influence of alcohol; and 20 per cent of the time, under the influence of other drugs.
See also G. Dingwall, Alcohol and Crime (Devon: William Publishing, 2006), esp. ch. 2.
28
See, e.g., Beard, supra, note 14.
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the offender lacks the subjective state of mind required for the offence
committed.29 It is in this latter category of cases where the law struggles
to craft an appropriate response. Clearly a person who has committed a
criminal harm while voluntarily intoxicated is deserving of both condemnation and some degree of punishment. The difficulty which arises
as a matter of logic is the apparent inconsistency in convicting a person
of an offence requiring a subjective state of mind when it is apparent that
the person did not have that state of mind due to a high level of voluntary
intoxication. Over time, the common law and penal codes around the
world have adopted various approaches in respect to liability for offences
committed while in a state of voluntary intoxication. The development of
the specific-general intent rule has been the dominant approach in
common law countries for two centuries.30
Prior to 1800, the common law never considered voluntary intoxication as a defence to crime;31 in fact, it was sometimes considered an
aggravation.32 The first signs that voluntary drunkenness would be given
some consideration appeared in the early 19th century.33 In a series of
cases starting with R. v. Meakin,34 R. v. Cruse,35 and R. v. Monkhouse,36
the courts held that if intoxication negated the specific or particular intent
required for the offence charged, there could be no conviction for that
offence. Although the expression “specific intent” was used in these
cases, there was no legal rule at this stage which divided intent into
specific and basic intent crimes. In R. v. Doherty,37 and R. v. Meade,38 the
29
See, e.g., C.N. Mitchell, “The Intoxicated Offender — Refuting the Legal and Medical
Myths” (1988) 11 Int’l J. of Law & Psychiatry 77, at 91, where the author cites studies indicating
that intoxicated defendants are rarely unaware of their actions and rarely act without intent. While
intoxication may make people less concerned about the consequences of their actions, it seldom
renders them unable to perceive those consequences.
30
For a more detailed historical account, see G. Ferguson, “Mens Rea Evaluated in Terms
of the Essential Elements of a Crime, Specific Intent, and Drunkenness” (1971) 4 Ottawa L. Rev.
356, at 373-78, which relies in part on R.U. Singh, “History of the Defence of Drunkenness in
English Criminal Law” (1933) 49 Law Q. Rev. 528 (1933) [hereinafter “Singh”].
31
Singh, id., at 536. See also Reniger v. Fogossa (1551), 1 Plowdon 2, 75 E.R. 1 (K.B.).
32
See Beverley’s Case (1603), 4 Coke Rep. 123b, at 125a, 76 E.R. 1118, at 1123 (K.B.).
33
See Rennie’s Case (1825), 1 Lewin 76, 168 E.R. 965 (Sp. Assizes); Marshall’s Case
(1830), 1 Lewin 76, 168 E.R. 965 (Sum. Assizes); Pearson’s Case (1835), 2 Lewin 144, 168 E.R.
1108 (Sp. Assizes); R. v. Thomas (1837), 7 C. & P. 817, 173 E.R. 356 (Oxford Cir. Ct.); but see R. v.
Carroll (1835), 7 Car. & P. 145, 173 E.R. 64 (Nisi Prius).
34
(1836), 7 Car. & P. 297, 173 E.R. 131 (Nisi Prius).
35
(1838), 8 Car. & P. 541, 173 E.R. 610 (Nisi Prius).
36
(1849), 4 Cox C.C. 55 (Central Crim. Ct.). See also the discussion in A.P. Simester &
W.J. Brookbanks, Principles of Criminal Law, 3d ed. (Auckland: Thomson, 2007), at 336-37
[hereinafter “Simester & Brookbanks”].
37
(1887), 16 Cox C.C. 306 (Nisi Prius).
38
[1909] 1 K.B. 895 (Ct. Crim. App.).
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English courts held that drunkenness as a defence was not restricted to
specific intent crimes and was available as a defence to any crime
requiring proof of intent. In 1920, the House of Lords in Beard39 articulated their oft-quoted statement of the intoxication rule in terms of
specific intent. Later in their judgment, the House of Lords held that
intoxication was not restricted to specific intent offences and could also
be used to negate any intentional offence.40 However, that wider rule was
not followed in subsequent cases. Instead, the intoxication defence in
England, Canada41 and some Australian jurisdictions became a rigid rule
that intoxication is only admissible to negate specific intent but not basic
or general intent.
The specific-general intent rule which excludes voluntary intoxication as a defence to general intent crimes has been vigorously defended
as a just rule that is based on the need to protect the public by punishing
intoxicated offenders. It is argued that a voluntarily intoxicated offender
who commits a (general intent) offence is morally blameworthy and
deserves to be convicted and punished for that offence. For example, in
the House of Lords’ decision in D.P.P. v. Majewski, Lord Elwyn-Jones
claimed that the general-specific intent rule is not “unethical or contrary
to the principles of natural justice”, and he justified the rule that intoxication is no defence to basic intent offences on the grounds that a person
who voluntarily “takes a substance which causes him to cast off the
restraints of reason and conscience, ... in my view supplies the evidence
of mens rea, of guilty mind certainly sufficient for crimes of basic intent.
It is a reckless course of conduct and recklessness is enough to constitute
the necessary mens rea in assault cases”.42 As with other defenders of the
specific-general intent rule, he gives no real explanation of why these
same reasons do not exclude intoxication as a defence to specific intent
offences.
Notwithstanding the above type of moral defence of the specificgeneral intent rule, it has been frequently criticized by courts, academics

39

Supra, note 14.
Id., at 504.
41
R. v. MacAskill, [1931] S.C.J. No. 3, [1931] S.C.R. 330 (S.C.C.); George, supra, note 14;
and Leary, supra, note 14.
42
[1977] A.C. 443, at 474-75 [hereinafter “Majewski”]. For a similar rationale, see Lord
Simon in Majewski, at 479. For another explanation of the moral and legal justification of the
specific-basic intent rule, see Mason J.’s minority reasons in R. v. O’Connor (1980), 146 C.L.R. 64,
at 110-11 (H.C.A.) [hereinafter “O’Connor”].
40
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and law reform bodies as unprincipled, illogical and arbitrary. In brief,
the primary criticisms43 include the following:
(1) The specific-general intent rule is considered both illogical and
unprincipled by many judges and commentators. For example, in
Daviault,44 Cory J., for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, held that preventing the admission of evidence of extreme intoxication to negate general intent offences is unprincipled and
contrary to principles of fundamental justice because it substitutes
the intent or recklessness to get drunk for the intent or recklessness
required to commit sexual assault in circumstances where the former is in no way morally equivalent to the latter.45
(2) The distinction between specific and general intent offences is
premised on linguistic manipulation of the definition or description
of an offence, not on any morally significant differences between
specific and general intent offences.46
(3) It is difficult in some cases to articulate and apply the distinction
between specific and general intent offences.47 This difficulty leads
to arbitrary and inconsistent results from court to court, offence to
offence and jurisdiction to jurisdiction.48
(4) The specific-general intent rule is an inadequate compromise
solution. Intoxication as a defence to specific intent offences has
been accepted by common law courts as an imperfect but tolerable
rule because it mostly arises in the specific intent offence of murder
and offenders who lack the intent for murder due to intoxication, are
still convicted of a serious, lesser included offence of manslaughter,
43
For a more detailed critique of the specific-general intent rule, see T. Quigley, “Specific
and General Nonsense?” (1987) 11 Dal. L.J. 75. Likewise, Dickson J., dissenting in Leary, supra,
note 14, gives a cogent and convincing critique of the specific-general intent rule.
44
Supra, note 3.
45
Id., at paras. 39-42.
46
See, e.g., O’Connor, supra, note 42, at 104. For example, in Canada, sexual offences in
ss. 271-273 of the Criminal Code are general intent offences and sexual offences against children
and young persons in ss. 151-153 are specific intent offences. Since intoxication is not a defence to
the former, what moral justification is there for it being a defence to the latter?
47
The definition of specific-general intent in George, supra, note 14, per Fautaux J., was
adopted in Majewski, supra, note 42. In R. v. Heard, [2008] Q.B. 43 (C.A.) [hereinafter “Heard”],
the Court interpreted the Majewski specific-basic intent distinction, which they acknowledged was
elusive, as indicating that a specific intent offence requires “proof of a state of mind addressing
something beyond the prohibited act itself, namely its consequences”.
48
The commonly repeated distinction that specific intent offences require a mens rea which
goes beyond the immediate actus reus — i.e., an ulterior intent — fails to explain why murder is
consistently classified as specific intent although it requires no ulterior intent. And the offence of
rape has also been difficult to classify.
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with a very wide sentencing range. But some specific intent offences do not contain lesser included general intent offences, and
therefore the intoxicated offender escapes conviction and punishment for any offence. For example, a thief who lacks the necessary
specific intent for theft will be acquitted entirely, with no alternative
conviction available.49 There is no moral justification for absolving
the intoxicated thief entirely.
Despite these criticisms, the specific-general intent rule continues to
be the law in England,50 in Tasmania51 and, in a modified way, under the
Australian Commonwealth Criminal Code Act, 1995,52 the Australian
Capital Territory Criminal Code Act, 2002,53 the New South Wales
Crimes Act, as amended in 1996,54 and in South Australia as amended in
2004.55 And in Canada, the specific-general intent rule still applies
although it has been significantly modified by Daviault and section 33.1
of the Criminal Code.
2. Leary and Pre-Charter Attempts to Alter the Specific-General
Intent Rule
The serious deficiencies in respect to the specific-general intent rule
led the majority of the Australian High Court in O’Connor56 to abolish

49
Theft has been classified as a specific intent crime: see, e.g., Ruse v. Read, [1949] 1 K.B.
377, approved in Majewski, supra, note 42; and George, supra, note 14.
50
See Majewski, id., and Heard, supra, note 47.
51
Criminal Code Act, 1924 (Tas.), s. 17.
52
Criminal Code Act, 1995 (Cth.), ss. 8.1-8.4, which provide that self-induced intoxication
cannot be used to negate basic intent, but restrict basic intent to intention to commit the prescribed
act or omission, but not intention in respect to requisite circumstances or results.
53
Criminal Code, 2002 (ACT), ss. 30-31 and 33. See Intoxication and Criminal Liability,
supra, note 22, at 126-27, where the relevant provisions in the Commonwealth and ACT Codes are
summarized.
54
Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 1996, Part 11A, which is summarized in Tasmania
Law Reform Institute, supra, note 17, at 57.
55
Criminal Law Consolidation (Intoxication) Amendment Act, 2004 (S.A.), s. 268. The new
sections are summarized in Tasmania Law Reform Institute, id., at 58-60. Under these provisions,
South Australia abolished the broad common law O’Connor rules in 2004, and reverted to a
narrower specific-basic intent rule whereby a presumption is created that an accused possesses the
necessary mental element in the act requirement of basic intent offences. However, where offences
require proof that the accused foresaw particular consequences or was aware of particular
circumstances, voluntary intoxication is admissible to rebut the existence of that foresight or
awareness.
56
Supra, note 42. As noted below, a similar attempt to abolish the specific-general intent
rule in favour of a negation of subjective fault rule was rejected by a majority of the Supreme Court
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the common law rule of specific-basic intent and replace it with a rule
that evidence of intoxication may be used to negate any subjective
mental element, including voluntariness, intention, knowledge or
subjective recklessness. A similar approach was taken by the New
Zealand Court of Appeal in R. v. Kamipeli57 five years earlier. The rule in
Kamipeli was also examined and endorsed as the most appropriate
intoxication rule by the New Zealand Criminal Law Reform Committee
in 1984.58 One of the major concerns about the Kamipeli and O’Connor
rule is the fear that it will result in a flood of acquittals and/or an increase
in crime. However, studies have indicated that this fear has not materialized.59 It takes a very high level of intoxication to negate a basic intent,
and therefore it is not surprising that it seldom occurs, although it can
still be argued that even one such acquittal may be one too many.60
Two years before O’Connor, the Supreme Court of Canada was
asked to reconsider the rule that voluntary intoxication is no defence to a
general intent offence. In Leary,61 the accused was convicted of rape. The
complainant testified it was a case of non-consensual, forced intercourse.
The accused argued that it was consensual. There was some evidence of
intoxication. The trial judge told the jury, “drunkenness is no defence in a
charge of this sort”. The Court of Appeal agreed: rape is a general intent
offence and therefore intoxication is no defence. A majority (6-3) of the
Supreme Court dismissed the accused’s appeal on the same grounds.
Justice Pigeon, for the majority, relied heavily on the unanimous decision
of the House of Lords in Majewski. In that case, the House of Lords
unanimously upheld the specific-basic intent rule. Justice Pigeon, for
of Canada in Leary, supra, note 14, and rejected again by a majority of the Supreme Court in R. v.
Bernard, [1988] S.C.J. No. 96, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bernard”].
57
[1975] 2 N.Z.L.R. 610, at 614 (C.A.). See discussion of Kamipeli in Simester & Brookbanks, supra, note 36, at 341-51.
58
New Zealand Criminal Law Reform Committee, Report on Intoxication as a Defence to a
Criminal Charge (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 1984).
59
See Tasmania Law Reform Institute, supra, note 17, at 81, where the Report refers to
some of these studies. See also M. Drassinower & D. Stuart, “Nine months of Judicial Application of
the Daviault Defence” (1995) 39 C.R. (4th) 280, where the authors found, out of thousands of
intoxicated offenders, only 20 cases of Daviault intoxication, only three of which succeeded.
60
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Daviault, supra, note 3, was met with a
barrage of public outrage and resulted in the Canadian Parliament quickly reversing part of Daviault.
A similar outrage occurred in South Australia in regard to the acquittal of a Mr. Nodruku, and that
acquittal sparked legislative reform in South Australia: see Tasmania Law Reform Institute, supra,
note 17, at 82. And the 1985 U.K. Law Commission Final Report, Intoxication and Criminal
Responsibility, rejected the O’Connor rule based on the same concern about acquittals of drunken
accused leading to public outrage and loss of faith in the justice system: Tasmania Law Reform
Institute, id., at 83.
61
Supra, note 14, affg [1975] B.C.J. No. 1051, 26 C.C.C. (2d) 522 (B.C.C.A.).
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example, expressly relied on Lord Elwyn-Jones’ justification for the rule,
quoted above. On the other hand, Dickson J., dissenting, vigorously and
persuasively set out the criticisms of the specific-general intent rule that I
have summarized above. He then concluded that the specific-general
intent distinction should be abandoned and that evidence of intoxication
should be admissible in determining whether specific or general mens
rea for the offence charged did in fact exist. He challenged the claim that
the general intent rule protects the public from violence. He also emphasized the importance of subjective mens rea in respect to the offence
committed, and rejected the argument that the fault in becoming intoxicated can be necessarily equated to the subjective recklessness that is
required for the offence committed, such as rape. Finally, he acknowledged that Parliament could, if it wished, create a separate offence of
drunk and dangerous.62
Although the abolition rule adopted in O’Connor and Kamipeli and
advocated by Dickson J. dissenting in Leary has several advantages, it
has one fatal disadvantage. In terms of advantages: (1) it adheres to
fundamental principles of responsibility by preventing conviction of a
person for a crime in circumstances where the requisite volition or
subjective fault element for that crime are not present; (2) it is logical
and straightforward in its application of the principles of responsibility;
and (3) it has not, as some feared, resulted in a spate of acquittals or an
increase in intoxicated crime. But the fatal disadvantage of the O’Connor
rule is the fact that it results in the total acquittal of some intoxicated
offenders. Except in the rarest of circumstances,63 an outright acquittal is
not morally warranted where a person has voluntarily become intoxicated and thereby taken a risk of committing some offence, and in that
state has in fact committed an offence. Furthermore, such acquittals lead
to public disillusionment in the justice system.64 In my view, abolition of
the specific-general intent rule, without the creation of a legislative
replacement, is socially and morally an unacceptable option.65

62

See id., at paras. 61-68 (S.C.C.).
The very rare case of a first-time drinker who was unaware of the intoxicating effects of
alcohol or other drugs may provide an example of a case where a conviction and criminal sanction
are not morally justified. This situation would be akin to mistake of fact.
64
See discussion of this point in note 60 above.
65
Surprisingly, in spite of the above criticism, the Tasmania Law Reform Institute in its
Report, supra, note 17, has recommended the adoption of the O’Connor rule as the best intoxication
option, and has rejected adding to it a new lesser included offence of criminal intoxication for
persons who are acquitted of the crime charged due to intoxication.
63
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3. The Specific-General Intent Rule after the Charter
In Bernard,66 the accused was convicted of sexual assault causing
bodily harm. He admitted that he forced the complainant to have intercourse, but he claimed that due to intoxication he did not know what he
was doing and that when he did realize what he was doing, he stopped.
The trial judge directed the jury that drunkenness was no defence to the
charge. The Court of Appeal agreed. The Supreme Court was then asked
to reconsider the Leary rule. Justice McIntyre (with Beetz J. concurring)
upheld the Leary rule, arguing that it was not artificial, illogical or
lacking in rational justification. Following the reasoning in Majewski, he
held that voluntarily getting so drunk as to lose control and cause
criminal harm is reckless behaviour and that recklessness is an adequate
mens rea for general intent offences such as assault and sexual assault.
He also concluded, somewhat briefly, that this form of substituted fault
does not offend section 7 or section 11(d) of the Charter.
Justice Wilson (with L’Heureux-Dubé J. concurring) held that withholding evidence of intoxication from the jury is appropriate in most
general intent offences because, except in cases of extreme intoxication,
evidence of intoxication is not capable of “raising a reasonable doubt as
to the existence of the minimal intent required for the offence”.67 Second,
Wilson J. disagreed with McIntyre J. and held that it is not necessary to
resort to the proposition that the mens rea in getting voluntarily intoxicated is an adequate mens rea for the subjective fault offence that was
committed, for example, sexual assault. She expressed her tentative view
on the basis of R. v. Vaillancourt68 and R. v. Whyte69 that McIntyre J.’s
“substituted mens rea” principle violated the presumption of innocence
in section 11(d) of the Charter and was not saved by section 1 of the
Charter. Justice Wilson upheld the specific-general intent rule but made
one significant modification, namely, evidence of extreme intoxication
involving an absence of awareness akin to automatism or insanity is
admissible to negate general intent. She argued that it is only in cases of
extreme intoxication that the evidence of intoxication is strong enough to
raise a reasonable doubt that the accused had the minimal general intent
for the offence charged. In that regard, Wilson J. stated:
66

Supra, note 56. See also R. v. Quin, [1988] S.C.J. No. 99, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 825 (S.C.C.),
where the Supreme Court justices each followed the reasoning that they had set out in Bernard.
67
Bernard, id., at para. 90.
68
[1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.).
69
[1988] S.C.J. No. 63, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
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... The decision of the House of Lords in D.P.P. v. Majewski ... may
stand for the rather harsh proposition that even self-induced
intoxication producing a state of automatism cannot constitute a
defence to an offence of general intent such as assault but I doubt that
our Canadian jurisprudence goes that far.
...
I believe that the Leary rule is perfectly consistent with an onus
resting on the Crown to prove the minimal intent which should
accompany the doing of the prohibited act in general intent offences. I
view it as preferable to preserve the Leary rule in its more flexible form
as Pigeon J. applied it, i.e., so as to allow evidence of intoxication to go
to the trier of fact in general intent offences only if it is evidence of
extreme intoxication involving an absence of awareness akin to a state
of insanity or automatism. Only in such a case is the evidence capable
of raising a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the minimal intent
required for the offence. I would not overrule Leary, as the Chief
Justice would, and allow evidence of intoxication to go to the trier of
fact in every case regardless of its possible relevance to the issue of the
existence of the minimal intent required for the offence.
It was argued by the appellant and indeed accepted by the Chief
Justice in his reasons that the Leary rule converts the offence of sexual
assault causing bodily harm into a crime of absolute liability in that the
Crown need not prove any mental element. This is said to offend
section 7 of the Charter as interpreted in Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act ...
and in R. v. Vaillancourt ... . With all due respect to those who think
differently I do not believe that the Crown is relieved from proving the
existence of the required minimal intent by the operation of Leary.70

Chief Justice Dickson (with Lamer J. concurring and La Forest J.
concurring on the law, but not the result) argued that the specific-general
intent Leary rule should be abandoned for the same reasons he expressed
in dissent in the Leary case. Second, he held that the Leary rule violated
sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter and was not saved by section 1. In
particular, he held that the general intent rule imposes a form of absolute
liability that violates the Charter. He also argued that the general intent
rule violated section 11(d) of the Charter. In cases of general intent
offences, he stated that “guilty intent is in effect presumed upon proof of
the fact of intoxication. Moreover the presumption of guilt created by the

70

Bernard, supra, note 56, at paras. 87 and 90-91.
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Leary rule is irrebuttable.”71 In his view, that was a clear violation of
both section 7 and section 11(d) since the presumed fact does not
inevitably flow from the proven fact. Chief Justice Dickson’s analysis of
why the general intent portion of the Leary rule is not saved by section 1
of the Charter is particularly instructive and relevant to a Charter analysis
of section 33.1 of the Criminal Code. It should be consulted by counsel
and courts engaged in a constitutional challenge to section 33.1.
In Daviault72 the constitutionality of the specific-general intent rule
was revisited. The accused was a 69-year-old alcoholic man who
sexually assaulted his 65-year-old partially disabled neighbour, after
being invited to her apartment. He had consumed approximately eight
beers before arriving and consumed approximately 35 ounces of brandy
while there. He had no memory of the sexual assault (although lack of
memory after the event does not necessarily mean he was unaware of
what he was doing at the time of the event). An expert pharmacologist
testified that with the quantity of alcohol in his system, a person could
well be in a state of automatism or “black out”. The trial judge acquitted
the accused. He applied Wilson J.’s reasons for judgment in Bernard and
held that the accused was in a state of extreme intoxication and that there
was a reasonable doubt whether he had the general intent to sexually
assault the complainant while in that state. On appeal, the Quebec Court
of Appeal held that Leary and George were still binding, that Wilson J.’s
modification of Leary in Bernard was not the law, and therefore allowed
the appeal and entered a conviction for sexual assault.
In a 6-3 decision, the majority of the Supreme Court disagreed with
the Court of Appeal, set aside the conviction entered by that Court, but
did not re-enter the acquittal at trial. Instead, the majority ordered a new
trial on the ground that the trial judge acquitted the accused using the
ordinary standard of “reasonable doubt”, whereas the majority ruled that
extreme intoxication akin to insanity or automatism is a defence to
general intent offences only if the accused establishes that defence on a
balance of probabilities. Thus a new trial was required to determine
whether that reverse onus could be met by the accused on the facts of the
case. Justice Sopinka dissenting (with Gonthier and Major JJ. concurring) held that the Court of Appeal was right in deciding that the Leary
rule applies and that drunkenness, regardless of its degree, cannot be
used to negate general intent. In essence, Sopinka J. followed the
71
72

Id., at para. 38.
Supra, note 3.
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reasoning of McIntyre J. in Bernard. He held that the Leary rule is not
fundamentally illogical and he concluded, as McIntyre J. stated in
Bernard, that “any logical weakness in this position is justified on the
basis of sound social policy”.73 Second, relying on his own views in R. v.
De Sousa74 and McLachlin J.’s views in R. v. Creighton,75 he held that
symmetry between the actus reus and mens rea is a general rule for
criminal liability, but is not a principle of fundamental justice since it is
subject to several exceptions. He concluded that one of those exceptions
is the general intent portion of the Leary rule. In his view, the Leary rule
does not violate principles of fundamental justice because the extremely
intoxicated accused who is convicted of a general intent offence is not
morally innocent. The accused’s moral fault in voluntarily putting
himself in that dangerous state is in his view sufficiently blameworthy to
substitute as the mens rea for the offence committed. Furthermore, he
held that this type of substitution is not disproportionate to the mens rea
for the offence committed, and therefore is not a violation of the principles of fundamental justice.
Justice Cory, for the majority, adopted the compromise approach of
Wilson J. in Bernard. He first discussed the two contrasting common law
approaches to the defence of voluntary intoxication. The first is to
maintain the traditional specific-general intent rule as supported in Leary
and Majewski, and the second is to abandon that distinction as was done
in O’Connor, Kamipeli and as advocated by Dickson J., dissenting in
Leary and Bernard. But with the advent of the Charter, Cory J. concluded
that a third way suggested by Wilson J. in Bernard was possible, desirable and indeed required by the Charter. Justice Cory adopted Wilson J.’s
view76 that the Leary rule is consistent with the Charter if it is modified
by adding the “extreme intoxication akin to automatism or insanity”
provision. Justice Cory then gave a fairly detailed explanation of how the
general intent portion of the Leary rule offends sections 7 and 11(d). In
short, to eliminate the requirement for proof of the requisite mens rea for
the offence charged and to substitute in its place an entirely different
form of fault — voluntarily getting extremely intoxicated — violates
principles of fundamental justice in both section 7 and section 11(d) of
the Charter. Justice Cory then gave the following brief explanation of
73
74
75
76

Bernard, supra, note 56, at 878.
[1992] S.C.J. No. 77, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944 (S.C.C.).
[1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Creighton”].
Quoted supra, note 70, at para. 90.
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why the section 7 and section 11(d) infringements in the Leary rule could
not be saved under section 1 of the Charter:
In summary, I am of the view that to deny that even a very minimal
mental element is required for sexual assault offends the Charter in a
manner that is so drastic and so contrary to the principles of
fundamental justice that it cannot be justified under section 1 of the
Charter. The experience of other jurisdictions which have completely
abandoned the Leary rule, coupled with the fact that under the proposed
approach, the defence would be available only in the rarest of cases,
demonstrate that there is no urgent policy or pressing objective which
needs to be addressed. Studies on the relationship between intoxication
and crime do not establish any rational link. Finally, as the Leary rule
applies to all crimes of general intent, it cannot be said to be well
tailored to address a particular objective and it would not meet either
the proportionality or the minimum impairment requirements.77

It is worth noting that Dickson J.’s section 1 analysis in Bernard is
significantly more detailed than Cory J.’s explanation in Daviault. In
addition, Cory J. went a step beyond the views of Wilson J. in Bernard in
one important respect. In a brief, summary fashion, he equated the new
extreme intoxication defence to the defence of insanity and concluded
that, like the insanity defence, the onus of proof should be on the accused
to establish Daviault extreme intoxication on a balance of probabilities. I
will return to this cryptic conclusion later.
4. The Enactment of Section 33.1
The decision in Daviault was rendered on September 30, 1994. It
was met with strong, adverse reaction from many quarters, including
strong interventions from feminist legal scholars.78 The Minister of
Justice and his officials scurried to find a solution. As usual, there was
plenty of “behind the scenes” lobbying. Section 33.1 was introduced as
Bill C-72 on February 23, 1995 and proceeded through Parliament fairly
77

Daviault, supra, note 3, at para. 47.
See, e.g., some of the public reaction which is cited by D. Stuart, Canadian Criminal
Law: A Treatise, 6th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2011), at 469-70 [hereinafter “Stuart”] and I.
Grant, “Second Chances: Bill C-72 and the Charter” (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 379, at 383 n. 12
[hereinafter “Grant”]. See also E. Sheehy, “A Brief on Bill C-72: An Act to Amend the Criminal
Code” (NAWL, 2005) cited in Grant, id., at 394 n. 49; C. Boyle, Issue No. 97 Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs in respect
to Bill C-72 (April 5, 1995); E. Sheeby, “Intoxication Defence in Canada: Why Women Should
Care” (1996) 23 Contemporary Drug Problems 595.
78
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swiftly.79 It received Royal Assent on July 13, 1995 and came into force
on September 15, 1995. Section 33.1 did not replace the common law
defence of intoxication with a complete codified provision. Instead the
Minister of Justice chose to craft Bill C-72 so that it only modified part
of the Daviault rule. In turn, the Daviault rule upheld the common law
Leary rule with one significant alteration. Thus, the law of voluntary
intoxication as a defence in Canada is now the Leary rule, as modified by
Daviault and as further amended by section 33.1.
Section 33.1 provides, in essence, that if a person voluntarily gets
into “a state of self-induced intoxication that renders the person unaware
of, or incapable of consciously controlling, their behaviour”, then that
person has departed “markedly from the standard of reasonable care
generally recognized in Canadian society and is thereby criminally at
fault” for any general intent offence “that includes as an element assault
or any other interference or threat of interference ... with the bodily
integrity of another person”. Put another way, such a person is acting in a
penally negligent fashion. If the person in that penally negligent, intoxicated state commits a general intent offence which involves assault, or
interference or threat of interference with the bodily integrity of another
person, the person is guilty of the offence committed even though he or
she lacked the general intent or voluntariness normally required for that
offence. In other words, the penal negligence in regard to getting voluntarily intoxicated becomes a substitute mens rea for the mens rea or
voluntariness normally required for the general intent, assault-based
offence that is committed.
One obvious problem with section 33.1 is that it seems to reverse
part of the Charter ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada in Daviault.
Not all of it, but part of it. Daviault intoxication (i.e., extreme intoxication) is still a valid defence to general intent offences not involving
assault or interference or threatened interference with another person’s
bodily integrity. Thus Daviault intoxication still applies to general intent
offences, such as some instances of forcible entry (section 72),80 trespassing at night (section 177), mischief (section 430), etc.
79
Bill C-72 was passed through the House of Commons, including a review of it by the
House of Commons Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, by June 22, 1995, and by July 12, 1995
it had passed through the Senate, including a briefer review of it by the Senate Committee on Legal
and Constitutional Affairs. No changes were made to the Bill throughout the Parliamentary process,
except to delete the phrase “basic intent” (which is used in England and some other countries) and
insert in its place the phrase “general intent”.
80
R. v. Watt, [1995] A.J. No. 455, 39 C.R. (4th) 263 (Alta. Prov. Ct. (Crim. Div.)).
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5. Constitutional Problems with the Law of Voluntary Intoxication
There are three constitutional problems with the current law of voluntary intoxication which I intend to address: (1) the possible unconstitutionality of section 33.1; (2) the reverse-onus imposed in the Daviault
rule; and (3) the gap in the Daivault rule whereby a mistake of fact that
negates a general intent is not recognized as a defence if the mistake is
caused by intoxication that is less than extreme intoxication akin to
automatism or insanity.
(a) Constitutionality of Section 33.1
In Daviault, the Supreme Court held that the portion of the Leary
rule that prevents extreme intoxication akin to automatism or insanity
from being a defence for a general intent offence is an infringement of
principles of fundamental justice in both section 7 and section 11(d) of
the Charter. The infringement in the Leary rule arises from the fact that
the fault of getting extremely intoxicated is treated as an adequate and
essentially equal level of fault as the fault required for the offence
committed, e.g., an intent to commit sexual assault. In Daviault, the
Supreme Court held that those two fault levels are not equivalent and
cannot be substituted one for the other. The Supreme Court further
concluded that this infringement of sections 7 and 11(d) cannot be saved
under section 1 of the Charter. Thus Daviault held that extreme intoxication akin to automatism or insanity must be recognized as a defence —
the Charter compels it!
Parliament’s enactment of section 33.1 appears to be an “in your
face” partial reversal of the Daviault ruling. Section 33.1 contradicts
Daviault by declaring that extreme intoxication akin to automatism or
insanity shall not be a defence to any general intent offence which
includes as an element assault or interference with the bodily integrity of
another. Thus, contrary to Daviault, section 33.1 states that extreme
intoxication is not a defence to offences of assault or sexual assault.
How did Parliament assume section 33.1, which is a partial reversal
of Daviault, would survive a subsequent Charter challenge? First, section
33.1 was drafted in a fashion to try to avoid the Charter obstacle identified in Daviault.81 To repeat, that obstacle was the Court’s finding that
81
See, for example, Justice Minister Rock’s testimony before the Senate Committee on
Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Proceedings of the Senate, Issue No. 46, June 28, 1995, at 46:22
and 46:25.
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substituting the fault of voluntary extreme intoxication for the general
intent of the offence charged violates principles of fundamental justice in
sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter. In my view, Parliament’s attempt to
avoid unconstitutional substitution of mens rea in section 33.1 has failed.
Section 33.1 declares that voluntary, extreme intoxication resulting in the
commission of a general intent offence involving assault or interference
with a person’s bodily integrity constitutes the criminal fault level of
penal negligence.82 While Parliament has the constitutional power to
create a (non-stigma) offence of sexual assault by penal negligence, it did
not do so. Section 33.1 still convicts the intoxicated accused of the
intentional offence of sexual assault when that person lacked the necessary general intent, and it justifies doing so by substituting instead the
fault level of penal negligence in regard to getting extremely intoxicated.
Penal negligence is not equivalent to intention and to substitute it in a
crime that is defined as requiring intention will continue to violate
sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter. This point is relevant to my proposal
later in this paper to create a separate set of penal negligence offences
which run parallel to general and specific intent offences, and which can
be used as an alternative lesser included offence if a person is so intoxicated that he or she does not have the requisite intent or voluntariness for
the subjective mens rea offence.
Parliament has sometimes created parallel offences whereby one offence is an intentional (or reckless) offence and the other is a criminal or
penal negligence offence; consider, for example, assault causing bodily
Bill C-72 is not meant to reverse the court’s decision in Daviault, but rather to address
the problems or limitations with the common law that were identified by the court in that
case.
...
In the Daviault case, the court found that troublesome because they were unable to find a
linkage between the blame or the conduct of ingesting the intoxicant and the gist of the
criminal act.
What we have done to bridge the gap and overcome that legal issue is to legislate a standard of care and conduct to say that anybody who puts themselves in that position falls
below that standard and is not able to rely upon that defence.
82
Conduct that is a marked departure from the standard of care expected of reasonable
persons has been classified as penal negligence by the Supreme Court: R. v. Hundal, [1993] S.C.J.
No. 29, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 867 (S.C.C.); R. v. Finlay, [1993] S.C.J. No. 89, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 103
(S.C.C.); Creighton, supra, note 75, R. v. Gosset, [1993] S.C.J. No. 88, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Gosset”]; and R. v. Beatty, [2008] S.C.J. No. 5, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 49 (S.C.C.). Criminal
negligence is a higher form of negligence than penal negligence and it applies to three Criminal
Code offences: ss. 220, 221 and 222(5)(b). It is defined in s. 219 as conduct showing “wanton or
reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons” which, according to the above case law,
also involves “a marked and substantial departure from the conduct of a reasonable person”: see also
R. v. Tutton, [1989] S.C.J. No. 60, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1392 (S.C.C.).
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harm (section 267(b)) and criminal negligence causing bodily harm
(section 221), or intentional or reckless arson (section 433) and arson by
penal negligence (section 436). By creating separate parallel negligence
offences for persons who lack subjective mens rea due to intoxication,
the improper fault substitution of negligence for intention in section 33.1
is avoided. Another principle of fundamental justice should also be noted
here. In Martineau83 and in Creighton,84 the Supreme Court stated that
causing harm intentionally must be punished more severely than causing
harm unintentionally. This fundamental principle of proportionate
punishment can be satisfied provided the two offences do not have the
same mandatory minimum punishment.85 This leaves Parliament open to
create the same maximum penalty for the penally negligent offence as for
the intentional offence, just as Parliament has done in sections 267(b)
and 221, or to create different maximum punishments as Parliament has
done in sections 433 and 436.
Apart from Parliament’s attempt to avoid a Charter breach in respect
to substituted mens rea, Parliament’s main Charter defence to its abrogation of part of the Daviault defence in section 33.1 is a claim that even if
section 33.1 involves an unconstitutional form of substituted fault, that
violation of sections 7 and 11(d) is justified under section 1 of the
Charter. Parliament tried to embolden its section 1 justification by
emphasizing the government’s pressing and substantial objective in
enacting section 33.1, and by attempting to impair the section 7 and
section 11(d) Charter infringement as little as reasonably possible by
restricting section 33.1 to general intent offences involving assault or
interference with bodily integrity. In regard to its pressing and substantial
legislative objective, Bill C-72 contains a long Preamble which expressly
sets out Parliament’s concerns about permitting a defence of extreme
intoxication to persons who commit assault-type offences. In particular,
those concerns relate to the strong association between intoxication and
violence, and the infringement of equality values that such a defence
involves, since the victims of this form of drunken violence are disproportionately women and children.86 These claims are real and legitimate
but may not be enough to overcome a section 1 Charter challenge.
Certainly, the government was not entirely confident that section 33.1
83
84
85

Supra, note 11.
Supra, note 75.
See Creighton, id., and Gosset, supra, note 82, as discussed in Stuart, supra, note 78, at

224-25.
86

See note 26, supra, and Grant, supra, note 78, at 388-90.
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would survive a constitutional challenge. In introducing Bill C-72 into
the House of Commons and in defending it in the Senate, the Minister of
Justice indicated that the government was seriously considering a
reference of Bill C-72 to the Supreme Court before it was proclaimed.87
That reference did not occur. It is, however, very surprising that 17 years
after its enactment, no appellate court in Canada has yet ruled on the
constitutionality of section 33.1, although appellate courts have, from
time to time, applied section 33.1 without commenting on its constitutional validity.88
On the other hand, courts of first instance have considered the constitutionality of section 33.1 on several occasions and have reached
different conclusions. There is virtual unanimity among those courts that
section 33.1 does violate principles of fundamental justice in sections 7
and 11(d), as articulated in Daviault. These cases have generally ignored
one strong feminist argument. That argument is that the removal of a
defence of extreme intoxication in cases of general intent offences
involving assault (by reliance on the device of substituted fault) should
not be seen as a violation of principles of fundamental justice since it
supports equality rights of women and children and is applied to a group
of extremely intoxicated persons who are not morally blameless for the
ultimate consequences of their conduct. This argument is, for example,
well articulated by Professor Grant.89 If the Supreme Court adopts this
legitimate approach (and I cautiously predict that it will not), section
33.1 may survive a section 7 challenge. The Court will then be required
to apply this same reasoning to conclude that the substituted fault in
section 33.1 does not violate section 11(d) of the Charter. If that is the
case, then the courts will not have to apply a section 1 Charter analysis to
section 33.1 of the Criminal Code.
In regard to lower courts that have examined the constitutionality of
section 33.1, the different conclusions reached by those courts arise from
their difference of opinion as to whether section 33.1 is a reasonable limit
on the violation of sections 7 and 11(d). In R. v. Vickberg,90 R. v. Dow91
and R. v. N. (S.),92 the courts engaged in detailed analysis before concluding that section 33.1 did not violate section 1 of the Charter. On the other
87
88
89
90
91
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See Proceedings of the Senate, supra, note 81, at 46:23.
See, e.g., R. v. Bouchard-Lebrun, [2011] S.C.J. No. 58, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 575 (S.C.C.).
Grant, supra, note 78, at 390-400.
[1998] B.C.J. No. 1034, 16 C.R. (5th) 164 (B.C.S.C.).
[2010] Q.J. No. 8999, 261 C.C.C. (3d) 399 (Que. S.C.).
[2012] Nu.J. No. 3, 2012 NUCJ 2 (Nu. C.J.).

(2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d)

THE INTOXICATION DEFENCE

137

hand, in R. v. Brenton,93 R. v. Dunn,94 R. v. Jenson,95 R. v. Cedano96 and
R. v. Fleming,97 the courts held that section 33.1 did violate section 1 of
the Charter. In regard to that conclusion, the reasons for judgment in
Brenton, Dunn and Jenson are most helpful. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to conduct a detailed critique of these two lines of reasoning. What
can be said is that it remains an open question as to whether the Supreme
Court will uphold or strike down section 33.1.
In my opinion, if the Supreme Court accepts the view that there is
another reasonable alternative open to Parliament to achieve its objectives of denunciation of the offender’s conduct and protection of society,
especially women and children, from drunken violence, without any
impairment of section 7 or section 11(d), then section 33.1 is bound to
fail the minimal impairment test in section 1 of the Charter. Later in this
paper, I argue that Parliament’s objectives can indeed be achieved with
no constitutional infringement by creating a set of penally negligent
offences which apply when an accused’s voluntary intoxication negates
the requisite subjective fault for those offences.
(b) The Reverse Onus for Daviault Intoxication
When Wilson J. fashioned the defence of extreme intoxication akin
to automatism or insanity for general intent offences in Bernard, she also
applied the ordinary standard of proof to that defence. In other words, the
Crown must prove the requisite intent, whether specific or general,
beyond a reasonable doubt. If a reasonable doubt exists, intent has not
been proven. Intent is normally proven by drawing inferences from all of
the evidence. If there is evidence of voluntary intoxication that raises a
reasonable doubt regarding whether the accused formed the minimal
intent required for general intent offences, then, as Wilson J. indicated,
the accused must be acquitted.98 Likewise, Dickson C.J.C., who dissented in Bernard, clearly recognized that the onus and standard of proof
93
[1999] N.W.T.J. No. 113, 28 C.R. (5th) 308 (N.W.T.S.C.), revd on other grounds [2001]
N.W.T.J. No. 14, 2001 NWTCA 1 (N.W.T.C.A.) [hereinafter “Brenton”].
94
[1999] O.J. No. 5452, 28 C.R. (5th) 295 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Dunn”]. See also K.
Smith, “Section 33.1: Denial of Daviault Defence Should Be Held Constitutional” (2000) 28 C.R.
(5th) 350.
95
[2000] O.J. No. 4870 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Jenson”]. The issue was not argued on
appeal: [2005] O.J. No. 1052, 195 C.C.C. (3d) 14 (Ont. C.A.).
96
[2005] O.J. No. 1174, 195 C.C.C. (3d) 468 (Ont. C.J.).
97
[2010] O.J. No. 5987, 2010 ONSC 5169 (Ont. S.C.J.).
98
Bernard, supra, note 56, at paras. 90-91.
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in intoxication defence cases remains on the Crown. In doing so, he
pointed out that mens rea is a fundamental requirement of criminal
liability and that it is always for the Crown to prove mens rea beyond a
reasonable doubt. He further noted that since intoxication affects one’s
ability to perceive the circumstances or appreciate the consequences of
one’s act, “therefore intoxication is relevant to the mental element in
crime, and should be considered, together with all other evidence, in
determining whether the Crown has proved the requisite mental state
beyond a reasonable doubt”.99
As already noted, in Daviault Cory J. for the majority of the Court
adopted Wilson J.’s expansion of the Leary rule to cover extreme
intoxication in the context of general intent offences. But with very little
analysis, Cory J. also stated that, like insanity, the burden of proof should
be on the accused to prove on a balance of probabilities that extreme
intoxication akin to automatism or insanity existed. In that regard, Cory
J. stated:
It should not be forgotten that if the flexible “Wilson” approach is
taken, the defence will only be put forward in those rare circumstances
of extreme intoxication. Since that state must be shown to be akin to
automatism or insanity, I would suggest that the accused should be
called upon to establish it on the balance of probabilities. This court has
recognized in R. v. Chaulk, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303, that although it
constituted a violation of the accused’s rights under s. 11(d) of the
Charter, such a burden could be justified under s. 1. In this case, I feel
that the burden can be justified. Drunkenness of the extreme degree
required in order for it to become relevant will only occur on rare
occasions. It is only the accused who can give evidence as to the
amount of alcohol consumed and its effect upon him. Expert evidence
would be required to confirm that the accused was probably in a state
akin to automatism or insanity as a result of drinking. ...
Extreme intoxication akin to automatism or insanity should, like
insanity, be established by the accused on a balance of probabilities.100

The reverse onus imposed in Daviault was not altered by section
33.1. That reverse onus continues to apply to general intent offences not
involving assault as an element. That reverse onus should be rechallenged when the next intoxication case reaches the Supreme Court.
There are a number of grounds to challenge it. First, Cory J. acknowl99
100

Dickson C.J.C., id., at para. 16.
Daviault, supra, note 3, at paras. 63-64.
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edges that the reverse onus violates section 11(d) of the Charter, but he
expresses the view that the violation can be justified under section 1 of
the Charter. However, he does not engage in a complete or detailed
section 1 analysis. Instead, he simply equates the extreme intoxication
defence to the insanity defence and then applies Chaulk101 as authority
for the constitutional legitimacy of the reverse onus. But insanity and
extreme intoxication are not virtually identical. Intoxication is a defence
because it negates mens rea. And mens rea is an element of liability
which the Crown must always prove beyond a reasonable doubt. On the
other hand, insanity may negate mens rea, but it is much wider than a
mens rea defence; it applies even if mens rea exists provided the criteria
in section 16 of the Criminal Code have been proven.
Second, the reverse onus in section 16 which deals with the mental
disorder defence is a historic anomaly dating back to M’Naghten’s
Case102 in 1843, a time when the burden of proof for affirmative defences
was less clear. In subsequent cases, including Woolmington v. D.P.P.,103
the burden of disproving affirmative defences, once there was an air of
reality to them, was clearly placed on the Crown beyond a reasonable
doubt. It is unfortunate that Canadian codifiers in 1892 incorporated the
reverse onus for the insanity defence into section 16 of the Criminal
Code. While one can at least say that the reverse onus in the insanity
defence is legislatively imposed, it is very disappointing to see the
Supreme Court, on its own initiative, judicially impose a reverse onus
where there is no need to do so.104 Third, there seems to be no convincing
rationale or justification to place the ordinary burden of proof on the
Crown in regard to the intoxication defence for specific intent offences
and to place it on the accused for general intent offences. That is illogical
and arbitrary, and is certainly difficult to explain to jurors in cases where
there is evidence of intoxication negating both specific and general
intent.

101

Supra, note 5.
(1843), 8 E.R. 718 (H.L.).
103
[1935] A.C. 462 (H.L.). The House of Lords treated the reverse onus in the insanity
defence as some sort of historic exception.
104
The Supreme Court compounded its uncritical acceptance of a reverse onus in Daviault
by then justifying a reverse onus for the defence of automatism in R. v. Stone, [1999] S.C.J. No. 27,
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 290 (S.C.C.), through the use of a bootstrap argument. The majority in Stone stated
that since the onus for the defences of insanity and Daviault intoxication are on the accused, then it
is logical and appropriate to place the burden of proof on the accused for the somewhat similar
defence of automatism.
102
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Fourth, a full section 1 analysis of whether the reverse onus for extreme intoxication is justified would easily put paid to the assumption
that it would be virtually impossible for the Crown to disprove extreme
intoxication without a reverse onus. That questionable assumption was
accepted in regard to the insanity defence by a majority of the Supreme
Court in Chaulk105 in the absence of any empirical evidence supporting
that assumption. On the other hand, Wilson J. relied on empirical
evidence in rejecting that assumption. My own brief empirical study,
which demonstrates that the prosecution can easily disprove the insanity
defence in states in the United States where the prosecution bears the
burden to do so, also supports Wilson J.’s conclusion on this point.106
Moreover, even if the assumption was true that mental disorder is such a
complex, uncertain state of mind that it would be virtually impossible for
the Crown to disprove it, that assumption has little or no purchase in
respect to the Crown’s ability to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the accused was not so extremely intoxicated that he lacked the general
intent for the offence charged. If the accused wants to raise an air of
reality to the defence of intoxication, evidence of how much the accused
drank or consumed will have to come from the accused. The credibility
of that evidence can easily be assessed against the actions of the accused,
statements by the accused and the observations of others. In addition, in
an effort to raise a reasonable doubt about the existence of extreme
intoxication, it is likely that the accused will call expert evidence in
regard to the effects of a certain amount of alcohol or drugs on a person’s
mental functions. Proof or disproof of extreme intoxication negating
general intent is no more difficult than proof or disproof of intoxication
negating specific intent, which the Crown must already do. There is
105

[1990] S.C.J. No. 139, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303 (S.C.C.).
See G. Ferguson, “A Critique of Proposals to Reform the Insanity Defence” (1989) 14
Queen’s L.J. 135, at 148:
The experience in the United States is particularly revealing. As of 1982, in half of the
States and in all federal courts, once there is some evidence of insanity, the prosecution
has the burden of proving the accused’s sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Does that
burden allow a throng of fabricated insanity pleas to succeed? Does it put an intolerable
or impossible burden on the Crown? I sampled the reported cases in those jurisdictions
for the year 1982. In almost all of the cases there was at least some expert evidence supporting the accused’s insanity plea. But in twenty-eight of the thirty cases, the defence of
insanity failed. The Crown proved its case; the accused failed to raise a reasonable doubt.
If anything, these figures suggest that even raising a reasonable doubt about insanity may
be too difficult a standard to meet rather than one which is too facile. (Incidentally, in
jurisdictions where the accused had the burden of proof on a balance of probabilities, the
accused’s insanity plea failed sixteen times in seventeen cases.)
106
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simply no need for justification to reverse the onus of proof for extreme
intoxication.
(c) The Mistake of Fact Gap in Daviault and Section 33.1
Both Daviault, and its restricted version in section 33.1, still allow a
person to be convicted of a general intent offence when that person
makes a mistake of fact that negates the general intent, if that mistake
was caused by a degree of intoxication that was less than the extreme
intoxication required under Daviault. Under Daviault, intoxication is
only a defence for general intent offences when the intoxication is
extreme. Otherwise intoxication is not admissible to negate general
intent.107 For example, causing a disturbance by shouting in a public
place is a general intent offence. An intoxicated person, who is not
extremely intoxicated, may intend to talk loudly, but due to his intoxication does not realize that he is shouting. But because his intoxication is
not extreme, the accused cannot rely on intoxication as a defence even
though the accused lacks the general intent to cause a disturbance.
Likewise, mischief (section 430) is a general intent offence.108 If an
accused intentionally kicks the side of a car, causing some damage, but
due to intoxication he mistakenly thinks the car is his own, he does not
have the mens rea for mischief. However he will be convicted because he
is not permitted to rely on mistake of fact caused by intoxication that is
less than extreme. The same would apply to a person charged with
assaulting a police officer, which is a general intent offence.109 If an
accused intended to assault a person, but by mistake of fact did not know
the person was a police officer, then the accused is acquitted of assaulting a police officer and convicted of a common assault.110 But if the
accused’s mistake is caused by intoxication that is less than extreme
intoxication, then intoxication is no defence and the accused will be
convicted of assaulting a police officer. And since the enactment of
section 33.1, the accused would also be convicted even if his intoxication
was so extreme that he did not have the general intent to assault anyone.
107

See, e.g., R. v. Moreau, [1986] O.J. No. 259, 26 C.C.C. (3d) 359 (Ont. C.A.).
R. v. Schmidtke, [1985] O.J. No. 84, 19 C.C.C. (3d) 390 (Ont. C.A.).
R. v. Tom, [1992] B.C.J. No. 2618, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 84 (B.C.C.A.) and Majewski, supra,
note 42; contra R. v. Vlcko, [1972] O.J. No. 905, 10 C.C.C. (2d) 139 (Ont. C.A.). The exclusion of
mistake of fact arising from self-induced intoxication in s. 273.2(a)(i) relates only to mistakes
concerning consent in respect to sexual offences in ss. 271-273.
110
R. v. McLeod, [1954] B.C.J. No. 104, 20 C.R. 281 (B.C.C.A.).
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109

142

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Chief Justice Dickson recognized this gap and anomaly in his dissenting judgment in Bernard. He argued that if a mistake of fact negates
the requisite subjective mens rea for an offence, whether that mens rea is
specific or general, an accused should not be convicted of that offence,
whether the mistake arose from intoxication or otherwise. The existence
of this gap in the intoxication defence has been largely ignored since
Dickson J.’s comments in Bernard. The continuation of this gap in the
current law of intoxication appears to violate principles of fundamental
justice under sections 7 and 11(d), and does not appear justified under
section 1 of the Charter. It should be challenged. This gap will disappear
under my proposal.
6. Intoxication and Subjective Elements of Defences
There is disagreement and uncertainty in many jurisdictions on the
question of whether an accused is entitled to rely on certain defences if,
due to voluntary intoxication, that person has a mistaken belief in regard
to an essential element of that defence.111 The disagreement and controversy should only arise in respect to defences which contain some
subjective fault elements. Where the essential elements of a defence are
defined on a purely objective, reasonable person standard, there is no
question that the accused’s self-induced intoxication should not be
relevant in determining whether those objective, reasonable standards
have been met. A reasonable person is a sober person. While intoxication, by itself, is not an absolute bar to an accused relying on a defence
such as self-defence, the intoxicated accused must nonetheless meet the
objective standards required for that defence in spite of his or her
intoxication. The issue of the relevance of intoxication in regard to
defences has most frequently arisen in the context of self-defence, but the
same issue can also arise with other defences such as provocation, duress
and necessity. The analysis of a mistake of fact caused by voluntary
intoxication with respect to an essential element of a defence needs to be
analyzed in a slightly different way than mistake of fact caused by
voluntary intoxication which negates the mens rea of an offence.
For defences like self-defence, the key question is whether the law in
the jurisdiction in question is defined solely in terms of objective
elements, or whether the defence contains a combination of subjective
and objective elements. For example, the key elements of self-defence in
111

See, e.g., the discussion in Tasmania Law Reform Institute, supra, note 17, at 104-112.
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section 34(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code are defined in both subjective and objective terms. Thus the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v.
Reilly112 held that intoxication is not relevant in determining whether the
accused (i.e., a subjective test) had a “reasonable” (i.e., an objective test)
apprehension of death or bodily harm and whether the accused “reasonably” believed he could not otherwise preserve himself from death or
bodily harm. On the other hand, New Zealand and some Australian
jurisdictions (including the Commonwealth, ACT, Tasmania and New
South Wales) have a different combination of objective and subjective
self-defence elements (i.e., “reasonable force or response in the circumstances as he or she perceives them”).113 Courts in New Zealand114 and
New South Wales115 have held that intoxication can be taken into account
when determining the accused’s perception of the circumstances in
regard to the need for self-defence. The accused’s perception of the
circumstances is relevant to both the perceived, but mistaken need for
self-defence and to the degree of force that is reasonable (an objective
test) under the accused’s mistaken perception of the circumstances (a
subjective test). For example, if an accused, due to intoxication, wrongly
thinks he is being unlawfully assaulted by another person with a gun, the
accused’s claim of self-defence would be judged upon his mistaken
perception of the facts in regard to both the need for self-defence and the
type of response that would be warranted if the mistaken facts actually
existed. The Tasmania Law Reform Institute in its 2006 Report supports
this latter approach, and recommends that intoxication should be relevant
to determining whether subjective, or partially subjective, elements of a
defence exist.116 I agree with this approach, subject to an important
corollary principle. Jurisdictions such as New Zealand and New South
Wales seem to treat intoxication as to subjective elements of a defence as
a full defence entitling the accused to an acquittal. That position ignores
the fact that the accused has caused a serious harm due to self-induced
intoxication and is deserving of condemnation and some degree of
112
[1984] S.C.J. No. 46, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 396 (S.C.C.). This also appears to have been the
view of Cox C.J. in Weiderman (Attorney General’s Reference No. 1, 1996) (1998), 7 Tas. R. 293
(C.A.).
113
Tasmania Law Reform Institute, supra, note 17, at 104-110.
114
R. v. Thomas, [1991] 3 N.Z.L.R. 141.
115
R. v. Katarzynski, [2002] N.S.W.S.C. 613.
116
Indeed, Tasmania Law Reform Institute, supra, note 17 goes one step further and recommends that intoxication should also be relevant in assessing the accused’s physical abilities (e.g.,
slow reactions, poor coordination) and therefore the increased degree of force that might be
necessary to defend oneself while intoxicated.
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punishment in the same way that the intoxicated offender who lacks the
requisite subjective intent for an offence is deserving of punishment.
Thus, I recommend that an accused who is acquitted of the offence
charged on the basis of a defence which is only applicable due to the
accused’s self-induced intoxication should be convicted of the new
penally negligent, intoxication-based offence described below.
7. An Alternative Offence for Intoxicated Offenders
In my view the best and most principled way to deal with voluntary
intoxication is to create a set of rules which (1) allow evidence of
voluntary intoxication to negate the subjective fault elements and the
voluntariness requirement of offences and defences; (2) permit conviction of persons who are acquitted of an offence by reason of voluntary
intoxication to be convicted of an included offence; (3) create a new
included offence which will be an unintentional form of the full offence
and will be called “unintentional [e.g., sexual assault, aggravated assault,
theft, etc.] due to criminal intoxication”; (4) the voluntariness requirement for this new penal negligence offence will be satisfied by the
accused’s prior voluntary conduct of becoming so intoxicated that he or
she ran the risk of committing an offence while intoxicated; and (5) make
the new unintentional offence due to intoxication punishable by the same
or a specified portion (e.g., 80 to 90 per cent) of the maximum punishment that exists for the full offence. The general parameters of the new
voluntary intoxication provisions would be as follows:
Voluntary Intoxication
(1) Voluntary intoxication shall not constitute a defence to any
criminal charge unless the conduct constituting the offence was
committed without the subjective fault element or voluntariness
required for that offence due to that intoxication.
(2) For the purposes of this section, a person departs markedly from
the standard of reasonable care generally recognized in Canadian
society and is thereby criminally at fault where the person commits the
conduct constituting an offence while in a state of self-induced
intoxication that negates the requisite subjective fault or voluntariness
for that offence.
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(3) Where the conduct constituting a criminal offence was done
without the subjective fault element or voluntariness required for that
offence due to voluntary intoxication, the accused shall be acquitted of
that offence and convicted of an included offence of unintentionally
causing that offence due to criminal intoxication.117 If the offence
charged is indictable, the included offence shall be deemed indictable;
if the offence charged is summary, the included offence shall be
deemed summary.
(4) The punishment for the offence of unintentionally causing an
offence due to criminal intoxication in subsection (3) shall
[insert option (a) or (b)]
(a) not exceed the maximum punishment for the offence that would
have been committed but for the intoxication.
(b) (i)

not exceed 15 [or some other nominated number] years
where the offence he or she would have been convicted
of but for the intoxication is punishable by life
imprisonment, or

(ii) in all other cases, not exceed more than [80 or 90 per
cent, etc.] of the maximum punishment for the offence
that he or she would have been convicted of but for the
intoxication.
(5) Voluntary intoxication is not relevant in determining whether an
accused has met objectively defined elements of a defence. However,
where any element of a defence is based on a subjective belief or
knowledge of a fact, an accused may rely upon his or her belief of that
fact even though that belief is mistaken due to voluntary intoxication.
(6) Where an accused meets the requirements of a defence based on
a mistaken belief, caused by voluntary intoxication, in respect to an
essential subjective element of that defence, the accused shall be
acquitted of the offence which he or she would have committed but for
the intoxicated defence and shall be convicted of an included offence of

117

If it was considered desirable or expedient, a provision could be added to create an exception for the included offence in cases in which the mens rea for murder is negated by voluntary
intoxication. Under s. 86(3), the offence would be called “unintentional murder due to criminal
intoxication”. It could instead be provided that the included offence would be manslaughter, as it
currently is.

146

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d)

unintentionally causing that offence due to extreme intoxication, in
accordance with subsection (3).

There is not space in this paper to fully explain this proposal, but a
few brief comments are in order.
(1) Advantages. This proposal abolishes the troublesome distinction
between specific and general intent and in the process also does away
with the Daviault and section 33.1 exceptions to that rule. The new
provision does not reverse the onus of proof and place it on the accused.
And by creating a parallel set of penally negligent offences due to
voluntary intoxication, there is no longer any concern about an unconstitutional substitution of mens rea.
(2) Differences from other proposals. Proposals for the creation of
some form of alternate offence for offenders who lack mens rea due to
voluntary intoxication have been considered in Canada and elsewhere.118
The creation of an included offence of “criminal intoxication” is the
proposal most frequently discussed. That proposal has been properly
discarded by academics and by the government when it was considering
its response to Daviault.119 That proposal has several flaws. First, it
improperly disguises the actual harm caused by creating only one offence
called criminal intoxication. A conviction for criminal intoxication may
involve minor harm such as creating a disturbance or major harm such as
aggravated sexual assault. Second, because the offence of criminal
intoxication would cover such a wide range of harm, it is very difficult to
establish a maximum penalty for that offence — 14 years would be
grossly disproportionate for causing a disturbance and six months, or two
years, would normally be grossly disproportionate for aggravated sexual
assault. In addition, there are possible constitutional problems with
respect to creating only one offence of criminal intoxication. My proposal suffers from none of these three defects. It creates a set of intoxication offences which match the harm caused. Since the name of the
offence matches the harm caused, there is no problem of inappropriate
118
See, e.g., T. Quigley “Reform of the Intoxication Offence” (1987) 33 McGill L.J. 1;
P. Healy, “Intoxication in the Codification of Canadian Criminal Law” (1994) 72 Can. Bar Rev. 515;
and Grant, supra, note 78, at 383-85.
119
See, e.g., the academics referred to in id. See also Senate Committee Proceedings on Bill
C-72, supra, note 81, at 46:24 and 46:25; and Department of Justice, Information Note, “SelfInduced Intoxication as Criminal Fault” released by the Department on February 24, 1995 when Bill
C-72 was tabled in Parliament. A proposal to create an offence of dangerous intoxication was
rejected in England. However, alternative offences built on criminal negligence have been enacted in
South Australia, Northern Territory, South Africa and Germany. For more details on these proposals,
see Ferguson, “Intoxication”, supra, note 15, at 276-79.
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labelling. Second, in regard to the penalty for the new intoxicated
offences, my proposal sets out two options for Parliament to choose
from: (1) the same maximum penalty for the intoxicated offence as for
the non-intoxicated offence; or (2) a reduced maximum sentence for the
intoxicated offence (e.g., 80 or 90 per cent of the maximum sentence for
the same offence committed by non-intoxicated persons).
(3) Intoxication and sexual assault. If section 33.1 is held to be unconstitutional and Parliament decides to enact the alternative approach to
the intoxication defence set out in this paper, these new provisions will
replace section 273.2(a)(i), which prohibits the defence of mistaken
belief in consent due to self-induced intoxication. Under my proposal,
mistaken belief in consent due to voluntary intoxication may be a
defence to sexual assault in some circumstances, but where it is, the
accused will be automatically convicted of the new included offence of
unintentional sexual assault due to criminal intoxication. If Parliament
chooses to keep the limitation in section 273.2(b) that mistaken belief in
consent is a defence only where the accused has “taken reasonable steps
in the circumstances as that person perceived them”, intoxicated mistakes
will sometimes succeed and sometimes fail as a defence to sexual
assault. Where the accused did not take reasonable steps in the circumstances as the accused mistakenly perceived them due to intoxication, the
accused will be convicted of sexual assault; where the accused did take
reasonable steps in light of the circumstances as he mistakenly perceived
them due to his intoxication, the accused will be acquitted of sexual
assault but convicted of the new offence of unintentional sexual assault
due to criminal intoxication. If Parliament is not satisfied with that result
— a result that I consider to be appropriate to those circumstances, then
Parliament can amend section 273.2(b) by deleting the expression “in the
circumstances known to the accused” and replacing it with the expression “in the circumstances as reasonably perceived by the accused”. The
insertion of the word “reasonably” will make the element of consent a
purely objective standard and thereby entirely eliminate the defence of
mistaken belief in consent due to self-induced intoxication.
(4) Penalty. I favour the reduced maximum penalty model noted
above. The existing specific intent rule inherently recognizes that
unintentionally committing an offence due to intoxication is somewhat
less morally blameworthy than intentionally committing the same
offence (pejoratively referred to as a “drunkenness discount”). At the
time Bill C-72 was enacted, the government indicated they did not want
to adopt a proposal (at least for general intent offences) which involved a
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sentencing discount for intoxicated offenders.120 So my proposal leaves
that option open for the government to choose.
As I noted above under the heading “Constitutionality of Section
33.1”, there is no constitutional problem with having the same maximum
penalty for the included offence as for the full offence. Maximum
penalties allow judges discretion to treat each case on its merits, including whether the intoxication in that case is an aggravating, mitigating or
neutral factor. There may be constitutional problems, however, if both
offences carry the same mandatory minimum penalty. For offences that
involve mandatory minimum sentences, the proper option is to declare
that the included intoxication offence has a lesser mandatory minimum
penalty than the full offence (e.g., 80 to 90 per cent).
(5) Procedural issues. Because the new intoxicated offence is specifically referred to as an “included offence”, there is no need under
section 662 of the Criminal Code to charge it separately. Juries will need
to be instructed, especially, in cases of multiple defences that “if you
have a reasonable doubt whether the accused had the requisite mental
element for the offence charged due to voluntary intoxication, you must
acquit him or her on that charge and you must convict him or her of the
included offence of unintentional [sexual assault] due to criminal
intoxication”. Concerns have been raised that creating a lesser included
offence based on intoxication would encourage plea bargains whereby
the accused pleads guilty to the lesser offence in circumstances where he
or she should be convicted of the full offence. While this is a legitimate
concern, the problem is not with the presence of an included intoxicated
offence for proper cases, the problem is with unregulated or improper
plea bargaining. If it becomes a problem, the solution is to better regulate
that form of plea bargaining.
(6) Name of offence. The name I have chosen for the intoxicated offence is not written in stone. The name “unintentional [sexual assault]
due to criminal intoxication” is in my view an accurate reflection of how
the intoxication defence is operating. However, the name could be
changed if Parliament thought another name was more appropriate. For
example, the offence could be called “criminal intoxication causing
[sexual assault]” or “[sexual assault] due to criminal intoxication”.

120
Ironically, by only amending part of the Leary and Daviault intoxication rules, Parliament has left sentencing discounts in place for specific offences and for general intent offences that
do not involve assault.

